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I. INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit organizations and government agencies with
conservation missions often must compete with private developers
for lands that have natural value.1 These organizations operate on
tight budgets,2 and they are wise to find ways to leverage their dollars
to achieve maximum conservation results. At the same time, many
natural area owners have an emotional connection with their land and
want to ensure its protection through the years, 3 but they may be
tempted by offers from developers. They could be facing financial
difficulties, ready for retirement, or concerned about creating estate
tax problems for their heirs.
Conservation easements have become very popular because they
meet the needs of conservation organizations and landowners.
Easements appeal to conservation organizations because many
landowners are willing to donate them, allowing the organizations to
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis; M.A.,
2004, Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University; 2003, M.P.A., School of
Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University; B.A., 1997, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This paper does not represent the views of my
employer, The Nature Conservancy. Many thanks to Daniel Cole, Alfred Gemrich,
Ashley Humphries, Leslie Ratley-Beach, and Michele Richey for their help in
developing this article. Enduring gratitude to David for his unending support.
1. Robert I. McMurry, The Intelligence of Growth: If the Future is "Smart
Growth ", What Have I Been Doing the Last 30 Years?, SE 11 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 125,
135 (1999).
2. Mike Lee, It's a Buyer's Market for Land Preservation, UNION-TRIB. (San
Diego), Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
3. R. Christopher Anderson, Note, Some Green for Some Green in West
Virginia: An Overview of the West Virginia Conservation and Preservation
Easements Act, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 617, 636 (1997).
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protect land at little or no cost. 4  Conservation easements are
attractive to landowners because they often provide substantial tax
benefits,5 and they allow owners to protect their land in perpetuity
while still maintaining ownership of it.
6
As of 2005, land trusts had preserved 6,245,969 acres in the United
States through conservation easements, more than doubling the
number of acres protected by easement since 2000. 7 That number
increased dramatically between 2006 and 20 10,8 during which time a
special tax incentive was in place which allowed conservation
easement donors to deduct greater percentages of the value of
conservation easements than for charitable contributions and carry
forward any excess for fifteen years. 9 Although that legislation
expired in 2009, conservation groups are lobbying Congress to renew
it and make it permanent.'
0
Reported violations of conservation easements are relatively rare,"1
but as the many conservation easements created in the last decade
"age" and the burdened land changes owners, the new owners may
have different ideas about land use than the owner who created the
easement.' 2 If these new owners do not understand or respect the
easement, enforcement issues may arise.
4. Daniel L. Aaronson & Michael B. Manuel, Conservation Easements and
Climate Change, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 27, 27 (2008).
5. GERALD J. ROBINSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAx'ATION OF REAL ESTATE §
11.13, at 8 (2009).
6. Adam E. Draper, Comment, Conservation Easements: Now More than
Ever-Overcoming Obstacles to Protect Private Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. 247, 254
(2004).
7. ROB ALDRICH & JAMES WYERMAN, THE 2005 LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT
5 (2005), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/land-trust-
census/2005-report.pdf.
8. Land Trust Alliance, Working for a Permanent Easement Incentive,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/taxincentives/federal (last visited Feb. 15,
2010).
9. Land Trust Alliance, How the Easement Incentive Works,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/taxincentives/federal/incentive-info (last
visited Feb. 15, 2010).
10. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 8.
11. J. Breting Engel, The Development, Status, and Viability of the
Conservation Easement as a Private Land Conservation Tool in the Western
United States, 39 URB. LAW 19, 35 (2007).
12. Jessica Owley Lippmann, Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard Case
of Endangered Species Protection, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 293, 334 (2004).
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Some land trusts do not have the resources to monitor easements
properly or to mount legal challenges when they find violations.' 3 As
a solution, some academics and concerned practitioners advocate that
states institute third-party enforcement of conservation easements,
which would allow state attorneys general, private citizens or other
conservation organizations to step in where a land trust may not have
the resources to challenge a violation. 14
While third-party easement enforcement will bring more alleged
easement violators into court, it is also important to ensure that courts
award meaningful remedies once they have found a violation.
Without proper enforcement, the public benefit of easements is at
risk. Legislatures can ensure proper enforcement by enacting
conservation easement enabling statutes that have strong purpose
statements and clear remedies. Courts should not hesitate to apply
the remedies allowed by law. Land trusts and government
conservation agencies must prepare to litigate these violations by
understanding how judges are making decisions in the courtroom and
taking lessons from the few cases that are available to date.
This Note focuses on the remedies available for conservation
easement violations and how courts determine which remedies to
award. Part I provides a brief explanation of conservation easements,
including their history and an overview of the recent controversy
surrounding them. Part II explores the remedies allowed by the
various states' conservation easement statutes. In Part III, this Note
suggests action the state legislatures and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should take to strengthen
conservation easements by making available remedies stronger and
clearer. Part IV reviews several court opinions resulting from
conservation easement litigation. In Part V, this Note suggests steps
that courts should take to ensure that they preserve the public value of
conservation easements. In Part VI, this Note suggests some factors
that land trusts should consider when they are litigating a
conservation easement violation. These suggestions will help land
trusts prepare to influence a judge's balancing test, whether the judge
13. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation;
Donors Reap Tax Incentive by Giving to Land Trusts, but Critics Fear Abuse of
System, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al.
14. E.g., Carol Necole Brown, A Time to Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-
Party Rights in Perpetual Conservation Easements, 40 GA. L. REv. 85 (2005).
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is deciding whether to grant an injunction or is awarding a remedy
after a conservation easement violation.
II. HISTORY AND CONTROVERSY
A. Background
In its Uniform Conservation Easement Act, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws defines a
conservation easement, also known as a conservation servitude or
restriction, 15 as follows:
[A] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property
imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes
of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or
open-space values of real property, assuring its availability
for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air
or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.16
Conservationists began using common-law conservation easements
in the late 1800s but did not use them regularly until the 1930s.
17
Courts were reluctant to enforce common-law conservation
easements for several reasons. 18 First, conservation easements are
"easements in gross"19 because no dominant estate is associated with
15. Land Trust Alliance, FAQ: Conservation Easement,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conserve/faqs/faq-conservation-easement (last
visited Feb. 17, 2010).
16. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1.1 (amended 2007), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bil/archives/ulc/ucea/2007_final.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2010).
17. 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.02 (1987).
18. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Summary:
Uniform Conservation Easement Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact summaries/uniformacts-s-ucea.asp (last
visited Feb. 17, 2010).
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining that an easement
in gross benefits "a particular person and not a particular piece of land").
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the easement. Traditionally easements in gross were valid between
the original parties but did not survive transfer of the underlying
estates to third parties. 21 Second, conservation easements are also
"negative easements" 22 because the easement prohibits, rather than
allows certain activities as an "affirmative easement" would.23
Historically the law disfavors negative easements. Third, the
common law did not recognize conservation or historic preservation
as a valid purpose for a negative easement.25 An overarching
concern of many courts was the "dead hand" problem, which is the
public policy concern against allowing a few private individuals to
make decisions about resource use that will stand long after their
deaths.26
With the goal of addressing the shortcomings of common-law
conservation easements, the National Conference of Commissioners
on State Laws created the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
("UCEA") in 1981. 27 The UCEA is a model act designed to guide
states in creating conservation easement enabling statutes. 28 To date,
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
20. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note
18.
21. Id.
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 550 (defining a negative
easement as "an easement that prohibits the servient-estate owner from doing
something, such as building an obstruction").
23. Id. at 548-49 (defining an affirmative easement as "an easement that forces
the servient-estate owner to permit certain actions by the easement holder, such as
discharging water onto the servient estate").
24. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note
18.
25. Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation
Easements: Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46
NAT. RESOURCES J. 65, 91 (2006).
26. Id. at 89-90.
27. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1.1 (amended 2007), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucea/2007_final.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2010).
28. See id. at Prefatory Note.
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UCEA, 29 and other states have adopted their own conservation
easement enabling statutes.
3 0
A landowner may sell or donate conservation easements to a
qualified organization. 31 A landowner who donates a conservation
easement usually will enjoy the benefit of an income tax deduction
and other tax advantages. 32 If he sells the easement, he will receive a
cash payment from the conservation organization. 33  The
conservation easement is binding on future owners of the land. 34
Conservation easements are popular with land trusts, which are
nonprofit organizations with conservation missions, 35 because they
allow the trusts to protect more land with less money.,, Most
easements are donated, 37 and even purchased conservation easements
are much less expensive than buying land in fee simple 38 because
only the development rights are purchased. 39 Easements allow land
trusts to protect land without having to own or manage it.40  The
caveat is that some land trusts underestimate the financial
commitment associated with the monitoring, stewardship, and
enforcement of conservation easements.
41
29. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note
18.
30. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 815 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
324.2140 (West 2007).
31. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 15.
32. Id.
33. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 687 (2007).
34. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 15.
35. Marc Campopiano, Note, The Land Trust Alliance's New Accreditation
Program, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 897, 902 (2006).
36. Neil Gunningham & Mike D. Young, Toward Optimal Environmental
Policy: The Case of Biodiversity Conservation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 265 n.92
(1997).
37. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 15.
38. William C. Means, Jr., Note, The Economic Value of Conserved Land:
Examining Whether Conservation Easements Represent a Sufficient Source of Land
Value to Influence the Outcome of Regulatory Takings Claims, 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
743,777 (2008).
39. Engel, supra note 11, at 73.
40. Aaronson & Manuel, supra note 4, at 27.
4 1. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 15.
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Another benefit to easements is their flexibility. 42 The parties can
carefully draft each easement to the needs of the landowner and goals
of the land trust.43 For example, one easement might prohibit the
building of additional structures, while another restricts the use of the
land to agricultural purposes only.4 4 This allows the parties to tailor
the easement to the natural area targeted and the needs of the
landowner. 45
B. Recent Controversy
In recent years, perceived abuses and large tax benefits to easement
donors have stirred controversy around conservation easements.46 In
2003, the Washington Post ran a series of articles about The Nature
Conservancy and other land trusts, criticizing them for accepting
conservation easements on golf courses and parts of luxury home
developments. 47 They discovered some easements that had benefited
the easement donors with large tax deductions but had questionable
48
natural value. Congress responded by launching an investigation of
The Nature Conservancy and land trust activity in general. 49 As a
result, The Nature Conservancy made changes in its governance,
policies, and procedures,5 ° which several senators praised.5' In 2006,
the Land Trust Alliance developed the Land Trust Accreditation
Commission, with a goal to "uphold the public trust and ensure that
42. Mary Christina Wood & Matthew O'Brien, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part
II). Evaluating Four Models of Tribal Participation in the Conservation
Movement, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 477, 495 (2008).
43. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 15.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Brad Wolverton, Senators Question Tax Breaks Taken By Donors to
Conservation Groups, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 8, 2005,
http://www.philanthropy.com/free/update/2005/06/2005060801 .htm.
47. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Joe Stephens, Nature Conservancy's President Abruptly Announces
Resignation, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2007, at A4.
51. Joe Stephens, IRS Starts Team on Easement Abuses, WASH. POST, June 9,
2005 at A6.
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conservation efforts are permanent."' 52 The Land Trust Accreditation
Commission works to improve professionalism in the conservation
field by creating standards in the field for organizational
administration, fundraising practices, and land stewardship
practices. 53 It also encourages land trusts to have resources available
to litigate conservation easement violations.54 The Commission
administers a voluntary accreditation program for land trusts that
requires participating land trusts to implement established best
practices in their conservation work. 55  The accreditation review
encompasses all aspects of a land trust's work, including how it
monitors and enforces conservation easements, relates to landowners
who have land subject to a conservation easement, and raises money
for conservation easement stewardship endowments. 56  The Land
Trust Alliance is also developing a conservation defense insurance
program, which would protect land trust assets in the event that a
trust needed to litigate an easement violation.57
The storm of controversy around conservation easements also
prompted academics and practitioners to debate the validity of these
easements as a conservation tool and to look for ways to ensure that
easements serve the public good.58 Academics have written many
articles discussing the permanency of conservation easements and
appropriate methods of modifying and terminating easements.59
Fewer scholars have studied the challenges to the enforcement of
52. Land Trust Accreditation Commission, The Accrediation Seal,
http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/why-accreditation-matters/about-the-seal
(last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
53. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST: STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, at i, 3-
7, 13-15 (2004), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/leaming/sp/lt-
standards-practices07.pdf.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Campopiano, supra note 35, at 913.
56. Land Trust Accreditation Commission, Indicator Practices,
http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/getting-accredited/indicator-practices (last
visited Feb. 17, 2010).
57. Land Trust Alliance, Conservation Defense Insurance,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/programs/conservation-defense/cd-
insurance (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
58. See, e.g., Draper, supra note 6.
59. See, e.g., C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8
WYo. L. REv. 25 (2008); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature
of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 421 (2005).
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existing conservation easements. With more than six million acres
already under conservation easement, and more than one million new
acres coming under easement every year, the question of
enforcement of existing conservation easements will grow in
importance. If governments and land trusts want to prove the
benefits of conservation easements to the public, they must
demonstrate they can properly monitor and enforce existing
easements to ensure that they serve the public good.
III. A STUDY OF THE REMEDIES ALLOWED BY VARIOUS STATES'
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ENABLING STATUTES
As mentioned above, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") passed the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act ("UCEA") in 1981,61 after six years of
debate. 62  The project developed out of a study funded by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") and completed by the
Conservation Law Foundation of New England in 1975. 63 Before the
UCEA was passed, at least twenty-nine states had passed their own
conservation easement legislation.64 The ABA was concerned about
the lack of uniformity among state laws, the problems caused by the
common law treatment of conservation easements, and the lack of
understanding of these problems among lawyers and legislators.
65
Federal organizations such as the Council on Environmental Quality,
the National Park Service, and the Department of Transportation, and
large nonprofit organizations like The Nature Conservancy and the
National Trust for Historic Preservation supported the project.66 The
NCCUSL designed the UCEA to promote uniformity among state
60. ALDRICH & WYERMAN, supra note 7, at 4-5.
61. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT (amended 2007), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucea/2007_final.htm.
62. King & Fairfax, supra note 25, at 74.
63. Id. at 73.
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id. at 72-74.
66. Id. at 74.
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statutes67 and to provide a solution to the problems associated with
common law conservation easements. 
68
The UCEA provides definitions of key terms,69  makes
conservation easements perpetual unless the agreement says
otherwise, 70 determines who may bring an action to enforce a
conservation easement, 71 and expressly removes many of the
restrictions placed on conservation easements by common law. 72 It
does not, however, address the issue of how to remedy conservation
easement violations. Among the twenty-three adopting jurisdictions,
only two altered the language to include a remedy for violation.
73
The Arkansas statute adds a clause to UCEA section 3 which states
''conservation easements may be enforced by injunction or other
proceeding in equity." 74  The Maine statute goes a little further,
allowing courts to "enforce a conservation easement by injunction or
proceeding at law and in equity,, 75 but also adds the following:
A court may deny equitable enforcement of a conservation
easement only when it finds that change of circumstances
has rendered that easement no longer in the public interest
or no longer serving the publicly beneficial conservation
purposes identified in the conservation easement. If the
court so finds, the court may allow damages as the only
remedy in an action to enforce the easement. 76
Among the states that have not adopted the UCEA but have
adopted their own conservation easement statutes, Colorado and
67. Id. at 72.
68. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note
18.
69. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1 (amended 2007).
70. Id. § 2(c).
71. Id. § 3(a).
72. Id. § 4.
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-409(c) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 §
478(3) (1999).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-409(c) (2003).
75. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 478(3).
76. Id.
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California are the only two that create strong remedies. 77  The
Colorado statute allows injunctive relief for "actual or threatened
injury to or impairment of a conservation easement." 78  It goes
further, allowing the courts to award an easement holder damages for
a violation of that easement. 79 In factoring the damages, the courts
may consider "in addition to the cost of restoration and other usual
rules of the law of damages, the loss of scenic, aesthetic, and
environmental values."
80
Using language similar to that of the Colorado statute, the
California statute also provides for injunctive relief and damages
where appropriate, allowing the court to include restoration costs and
the loss of scenic and environmental values in determining awards.81
It goes even further than the Colorado statute by allowing the court to
award litigation costs, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party in any conservation easement litigation. 82
IV. SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS
State legislatures are in the best position to ensure the long-term
viability of conservation easements. Legislatures should take a
number of steps to ensure that conservation easements continue to
serve the public interest long into the future by strengthening their
conservation easement enabling statutes. First, they should give
these statutes clear purpose statements that emphasize that
conservation of natural and historical resources is an important public
policy. Second, they should make clearer the civil remedies that are
available when conservation easements are violated. Third, they
should authorize punitive damages and criminal sanctions in cases of
egregious violations. Finally, they should require the disgorgement
of profits in cases where the damage created by an easement violation
is irreparable.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.7(b)-(c) (West 2007); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
30-108.5(2)-(3) (2008).
78. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-30-108.5(2).
79. Id. § 38-30-108.5(3).
80. Id.
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.7(b)-(c).
82. Id. § 815.7(d).
2010]
608 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIE W
A. Make Clear the Public Interest in Preserving Agricultural,
Historical, and Natural Resources
Many states acknowledge the public policy interest in conservation
easements expressly in their statutes. 83 California's statute provides a
good example:
The Legislature finds and declares that the preservation of
land in its natural, scenic, agricultural, historical, forested,
or open-space condition is among the most important
environmental assets of California. The Legislature further
finds and declares it to be the public policy and in the
public interest of this state to encourage the voluntary
conveyance of conservation easements to qualified
nonprofit organizations. 84
Rhode Island's statute expressly acknowledges the discount that
the state enjoys through the support of conservation easements, as
compared to buying conservation lands outright: "This chapter is...
intended to provide the people of Rhode Island with the continued
diversity of history and landscape that is unique to this state without
great expenditures of public funds." 85
Some courts already have relied on these statements of legislative
purpose when analyzing conservation easement cases. 86  In
Tennessee Environmental Council v. Bright Par Associates, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals considered whether an environmental
organization, not a party to the conservation easement, had standing
83. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.7 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 457A.1
(West 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.870 (West 2007); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 49-0301 (McKinney 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.67 (West 2004); 32
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5052 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-1 (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-302 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6301 (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.34.200 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-12-2
(West 2008).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.
85. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-1.
86. See, e.g., Viii. of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1986);
Tennessee Envtl. Council v. Bright Par 3 Assoc., No. E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV,
2004 WL 419720 (TENN. CT. App. Mar. 8, 2004); United States v. Blackman, 613
S.E.2d 442 (Va. 2005).
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to sue for its enforcement.8 7 The easement agreement gave only the
grantee of the easement standing to sue for enforcement.8 8  In
evaluating whether third parties might have standing to sue for
enforcement, the court looked to the Tennessee conservation
easement enabling statute's purpose. 89 It says that a conservation
easement "is held for the benefit of the people of Tennessee." 90 The
court interpreted that statement of purpose to mean that every
Tennessee citizen has standing to sue for enforcement of any
conservation easement. 91 The Tennessee legislature reacted to that
decision by passing legislation that, while preserving the purpose
statement, also clarified that only government entities or qualified
conservation easement holders were eligible for third-party
standing. 
92
In Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Foundation, the court looked to
the New Jersey legislature's statement of purpose for its conservation
easement enabling act when determining whether the property tax
assessment of a piece of property should be lowered after the owner
grants a conservation easement. 93  Interpreting the legislature's
findings and declaration, 94 the court said "[t]he public benefits of
conservation easements are beyond debate." 95 It held that grantors of
87. Tenn. Envtl. Council, 2004 WL 419720, at *3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-303 (2004).
91. Tenn. Envtl. Council, 2004 WL 419720, at *3.
92. 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 348-349 §§ 1-3 (adding subsection (7) to Tenn. Code
Ann. § 66-9-303 which limits "third-party right of enforcement" to "a right
expressly provided in a conservation easement to enforce any of its terms granted
to a public body, charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust
that, although eligible to be a holder, is not a holder").
93. Vill. of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986).
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.63 (West 2002). The statute states:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that natural open space areas for
public recreation and conservation purposes are rapidly diminishing; that
public funds for the acquisition and maintenance of public open space
should be supplemented by private individuals and conservation
organizations; and that it is therefore in the public interest to encourage the
dedication of privately-owned open space to public use and enjoyment as
provided for in this act.
Id.
95. Vill. of Ridgewood, 517 A.2d at 137.
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conservation easements are entitled to a reduction in the assessed
value of property encumbered by conservation easement.
96
In United States v. Blackman, the Virginia Supreme Court
considered the validity of a conservation easement that was created
before the Virginia legislature had enacted its modem conservation
easement enabling statute. 97 Before holding that the easement was
valid, 98 the court emphasized Virginia's strong public policy of
supporting both historical and natural conservation, as expressed in
its "Open Space Land Act" 99 and, more importantly, in Virginia's
constitution.100 Article XI, section 1 of the Virginia constitution
declares Virginia's commitment to conservation:
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and
the use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public
lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and
utilize its natural resources, its public lands, and its
historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall be the
Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands,
and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for
the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of
the Commonwealth. 01
Thus, by making clear the public policy of supporting
conservation, the Virginia legislature made it easy for the Virginia
courts to uphold a conservation easement.
B. Make Clear Which Remedies are Available for Conservation
Easement Violations
If states want to ensure that conservation easements serve the
public good over the long term, they must create clear and
meaningful consequences for those who violate easements. Having
clear and meaningful consequences is also fairer to easement grantors
96. Id. at 138.
97. United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 443 (Va. 2005).
98. Id. at 449.
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1700 (2006).
100. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 447.
101. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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and grantees because they are better able to predict the legal outcome
of their actions and can plan accordingly.
The Colorado and California legislatures have made the public
interest in conservation clear by creating meaningful statutory
remedies for the violation of conservation easements. Other states
should follow their lead. The Colorado and California statutes
rightfully make equitable relief the first choice for actual or potential
conservation easement violation. 10 2  The best way to protect an
easement's value is to enjoin any activity that threatens it.103 Like
California, 0 4 states also should authorize payment of attorney's fees
to the prevailing party in conservation easement violation litigation.
This would encourage cash-strapped land trusts to pursue easement
violators when they know their case is strong because they could be
fairly certain of recovering their legal costs. It would also reward
attorneys who take easement violation cases, in the same way that 42
U.S.C. § 1988 encourages attorneys to take civil rights cases by
allowing prevailing plaintiffs to collect reasonable attorney's fees. 1
05
C. Authorize Punitive Damages and Criminal Sanctions for
Egregious Easement Violations
State legislatures should go even further than providing for
injunction and money damages. They should authorize punitive
damages and criminal sanctions in extreme cases, where the violation
is willful and the natural value of the easement is irreparably harmed.
Real estate developers may be attracted to properties under
conservation easement for their scenic beauty and make a business
decision to violate the easement and pay damages in the hope of
making a handsome profit through building and selling
improvements. In the law of contracts, no stigma attaches to parties
who choose to break a contract and pay damages rather than fulfill
the contract. 106 Allowing parties to do this often serves the public
102. COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.5-108(2) (West 1989); CAL. Crv. CODE §
815.7(b)-(c) (West 2007).
103. Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good:
Preserving the Environment on Public Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 389-90
(2001).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.7.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
106. Robin Paul Malloy, Advertising and the Commodiflcation of Law(yers), 14
LAW & LITERATURE 197, 200-01 (2002).
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policy interests in efficiency and allowing markets to operate
freely. 107 Legislatures should not apply this line of legal thinking to
conservation easements. Conservation easements serve a different
public interest, which is preserving land and buildings with important
natural or historical value. That public interest should weigh heavily
where easements are concerned. By creating the possibility of
punitive damages or criminal sanctions for easement violations, state
legislatures can prevent many egregious violations.
Punitive damage awards could help land trusts more fully mitigate
the loss of conservation values in a particular easement where actual
damage awards are inadequate. Actual damages are difficult to prove
in easement violation cases. It is difficult to prove how much an
endangered wildflower is worth, or what it would take to restore a
complex ecosystem. Punitive damages would give easement grantees
the opportunity to mitigate the damage to the natural value of the
property in a meaningful way.
D. Provide for Disgorgement of Profits Where Damage is
Irreparable
Finally, when owners of land under conservation easement violate
the easement and cause irreparable harm, state legislatures should
require the disgorgement of profits for easements that were sold and
restitution of tax benefits for donated easements. 08 Failing to do so
cheats the public of the benefits that the grantor promised when
entering into the conservation easement. Conservation easements
usually lower the market value of the underlying land by restricting
its use. 109 For this reason, it is fair to hold later-generation owners
just as accountable as the original grantor because the price they paid
for their property reflected the restrictions created by the easement.
107. Id.
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.5 cmt. a (2000).
109. Faith R. Rivers, The Public Trust Debate: Implications for Heirs' Property
Along the Gullah Coast, 15 S. E. ENVTL. L. J. 147, 166 (2006).
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V. CASE HISTORY REVIEW
This section provides an overview of cases in which courts made
enforcement decisions, 1 0 focusing on the reasoning courts used to
determine remedies awarded or whether to grant an injunction. Due
to the dearth of cases about conservation easements, this Note will
discuss a few cases that are unpublished or still active. These cases
provide valuable insight into the attitudes and thought processes of
judges in various jurisdictions around the country.
A. Courts Ordering Remediation
1. Conservation Commission v. DiMaria
In this Connecticut case, a trial court examined a conservation
easement that prohibited excavation, filling, removal of vegetation or
the construction of buildings on a two-thirds acre wetland area.111
The two-thirds of an acre was part of a larger 2.82 acre plot with a
residence." 2 DiMaria wanted to build a horse barn in the area not
subject to the conservation easement. 113 She failed to seek the proper
permits from the Fairfield Conservation Commission, the municipal
regulatory agency with jurisdiction over wetlands. l14 In the process
of preparing the site, her contractor put 350 cubic yards of fill dirt
110. See United States v. Blackman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12572 (4th Cir. May
31, 2007); United States v. Peterson, 178 F. App'x 615 (8th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987); Fox Chapel v. Walters, No. CV
07-8008-PCT-JAT, 2007 WL 2265684 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2007); United States v.
Ponte, 246 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Me. 2003); Feduniak v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 148
Cal. App. 4th 1346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Conservation Comm'n v. DiMaria, No.
CV054009431S, 2008 WL 3307154 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 2008); Bagley v.
Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994); Bjork v.
Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, No.
RE-07-077, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS 140 (Super. Ct. June 29, 2007), aft'd, 2009
ME 29, 967 A.2d 690; W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Cullen, 886 N.Y.S.2d
303 (App. Div. 2009); W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Town of Amherst, 773
N.Y.S. 2d 768 (App. Div. 2004); LaBarbera v. Town of Woodstock, 814 N.Y.S. 2d
376 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
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into the area covered by the conservation easement.1 1 5  The
Conservation Commission also claimed that DiMaria had clear-cut
trees in the conservation easement area.11 6 The Commission ordered
DiMaria to remove the fill from the wetland area and to plant at least
100 trees and 100 shrubs that were native to Connecticut in the
upland area. 11 7
The trial court found that the evidence showed that DiMaria
inadvertently put the fill dirt into the conservation easement area but
that her actions were not deliberate or willful." 8 The court also
highlighted DiMaria's efforts to stabilize the upland area to prevent
further erosion into the conservation easement. 1 9 The court found
that the evidence did not support the claim that DiMaria engaged in
clear-cutting of trees. 120 She had cut trees on the upland area not
subject to the conservation easement, but this activity did not
adversely affect the area protected by the conservation easement. 121
The trial court's opinion is sympathetic to DiMaria, finding
testimony that she did not know permits were required credible, that
her actions were not willful or deliberate, and that she had offered to
remove the fill that her contractor had deposited in the area covered
by the conservation easement. 122 The opinion is also critical of the
Fairfield Conservation Commission's "rush to judgment and
immediate resort to legal process." 123
Nonetheless, the trial court ordered remediation by removing the
fill dirt but did not order tree planting or attorney fees to the Fairfield
Conservation Commission. 124 It noted that removing the fill might
not produce conservation benefits but still ordered DiMaria to
remove it because not imposing a sanction "could have the effect of
encouraging unauthorized filling of wetlands." 125 The court declined
to require DiMaria to plant trees or shrubs as requested by the
115. Id. at *6.
116. DiMaria, 2008 WL 3307154, at *6.
117. Id. at *7.
118. Id. at *6.
119. Id. at *7.
120. Id. at *6.
121. DiMaria, 2008 WL 3307154, at *9.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *10.
124. Id. at *9-10.
125. Id. at *9.
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Conservation Commission,' 26 noting that this would have resulted in
more trees on the property than existed before the work began and
that the law does not allow the Commission to order property
improvements in the name of restoration. 
127
2. Bjork v. Draper
This Illinois case arose from a dispute about a conservation
easement that protected the gardens surrounding a historic home in a
neighborhood that is included in the National Register of Historic
Places. 128 Previous owners granted a conservation easement to the
Lake Forest Open Lands Association, agreeing to preserve the land-
use patterns existing at the time the land was restricted.129 The new
owners worked with the Association to amend the conservation
easement to allow them to make landscaping changes and build a
new driveway. 130 Neighbors sued to enforce the easement, alleging
that the Association and homeowner could not amend the easement
without a court order and asking for a declaratory judgment declaring
the amendment invalid. 131
The trial court judge in Bjork visited the property in order to make
findings about the changes.' 32 After walking the property, the trial
judge determined that while the driveway did not interfere with the
conservation purposes of the easement,' 33 the new landscaping did
not conform to the agreement the new owners had made with the
Association. 134 Accordingly, the trial court ordered the new owners
to remove certain vegetation within ninety days and awarded the
plaintiffs their costs, but it did not declare the amendment invalid. 135
The court of appeals affirmed that the Association and homeowner
could amend the easement without court order because the easement
agreement's language contemplated the possibility of amendment.'
36
126. Id. at *7.
127. DiMaria, 2008 WL 3307154, at *7.
128. Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 568.
131. Id. at 569.
132. Id. at 570.
133. Bjork, 886 N.E.2d at 571.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 572.
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The appellate court noted that the easement's true purpose was to
preserve the property's conservation values in perpetuity, and the
conservation values of the property were not synonymous with the
language of the easement.' 37 One clause in the easement agreement,
however, expressly prohibited improvements on the restricted
property. 138 The appellate court found the amendments to be invalid
due to that clause. 1
39
The appellate court here noted that a court may grant whatever
relief it deems equitable to enforce an easement. 140 It stated that it is
appropriate for a trial court to balance the equities between the parties
in determining relief but that it may refuse to do so if the easement
violation is intentional or culpably negligent. 141 It also issued an
important caution about balancing the equities between parties in this
situation:
[I]f a landowner could avoid complying with the terms of a
conservation easement by making alterations and then
claiming it would be too costly (and, thus, inequitable) to
return the property to its original condition, then the
restrictions placed in a conservation easement could be
rendered meaningless .... [W]e must avoid interpreting an
easement such that any provision becomes superfluous. 142
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to consider
equitably what the new owners must do to remediate the violation. 143
Finally, the appellate court wrote that the trial court acted
appropriately in denying attorney's fees to the plaintiff neighbors
because the grantee of the easement was the Association, not the
neighbors. 144  The easement agreement contained a fee-shifting
clause, but it addressed only the fees of an enforcing grantee and not
a third-party enforcer. 1
45
137. Id.
138. Bjork, 886 N.E.2d at 572.
139. Id. at 574.
140. Id. at 575.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Bjork, 886 N.E.2d at 575.
144. Id. at 576.
145. Id.
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3. Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission
In this California Court of Appeals case, the owners had purchased
a luxury home for $13,000,000, unaware that it was encumbered by a
conservation easement that the previous owners had violated when
they built a golf course on the property. 146 The previous owners did
not disclose the easement, and the title company did not find it in its
search. 147 The golf course had been in place for eighteen years when
the California Coastal Commission first learned of it in 2002 and
ordered the owners to remove it and replace it with native vegetation,
per the conservation easement agreement. 148 The owners refused to
do so because the golf course was the reason they purchased the
home. 149  They offered to mitigate by funding restoration work
elsewhere at a financial cost greater than removing the golf course
from their land, but the Commission refused this offer and ordered
that the owners remove the golf course. 50 The trial court agreed
with the owners, holding that the Commission was equitably
estopped 151 from enforcing the conservation easement. 152  The
appellate court reversed, finding that the public interest in the
easement outweighed the harm done to the owners by removing the
golf course. 153 It criticized the trial court for devaluing the "strong
public interest in the natural state of the coast and its native
vegetation"'' 54 and for ignoring the evidence the Commission
produced to show that "the golf course itself represented ongoing
developmental damage to the coast that continued to frustrate the
public interest in having the parcel restored to its natural state." 155
The court was sympathetic to the "inadequate funding and staff ' 56
that the Commission's enforcement division had, as the Commission
146. Feduniak v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 597 (Ct. App.
2007).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 599-600.
149. Id. at 600.
150. Id. at 599.
151. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 600.
152. Id. at 599.
153. Id. at 615.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598.
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accepted more than one thousand new easements each year. 157 It did
not consider the financial injury to the owners to be very great
because they had offered to pay more money to mitigate the problem
off-site.' 58 While acknowledging that the loss of the enjoyment of
the golf course is a real harm, the court said that three public policy
concerns outweighed their harm: (1) eliminating an unpermitted
development that had been present for twenty years, (2) the public
interest in having the property returned to native vegetation, and (3)
protecting the Commission's future ability to enforce conservation
easements. 1
59
4. United States v. Ponte
In this case, the Maine federal district court considered whether to
force the owner of land subject to a conservation easement to remove
a platform that the owner had constructed. 160  The easement
prohibited new structures, "except those for which immediate
proximity to the water is essential."' 61 The owners built a twenty by
twenty-four foot platform along the water, claiming that it was
essential for unloading supplies from a boat because the ground along
the water was uneven and wet, and the property was accessible only
by water. 162 The court did not agree that these reasons made the
platform's immediate proximity to the water essential. 163 In its
opinion, the court also noted the defendants' continued bad behavior
during the case. They had refused to hire counsel despite warnings
from the court that legal entities (the property was owned by a trust)
must be represented by a licensed attorney in federal court. 164 They
also failed to appear in court on multiple occasions, which resulted in
a default order against them. 165 The court ordered the defendants to
remove the platform and restore the land to its pre-construction
condition. 166 Further, it authorized the government to remove the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 616.
159. Id. at 617.
160. United States v. Ponte, 246 F. Supp. 2d 74, 75 (D. Me. 2003).
161. Id. at 75.
162. Id. at 79-80.
163. Id. at 79.
164. Id. at 75.
165. Ponte, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
166. Id. at 81.
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platform if the defendants did not do so by a specified date, and it
permanently enjoined and restrained the defendants from trespassing
on the conservation easement.'
67
5. Bagley v. Foundation for the Preservation of Historic
Georgetown
In this case, the landowner built two air-conditioning towers that
violated a historic conservation easement agreement with the
Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown. 68  The
easement agreement required the landowner to get the Foundation's
consent in writing before building any structures on his property. 
69
When the Foundation learned of the additions, the landowner
admitted that he should have asked permission to build the towers
and requested that the Foundation work with him to negotiate an
acceptable remedy, without requiring him to tear down the
structures. ' 70 The Foundation refused to negotiate a design until he
tore down the structures. 71  When the landowner refused, the
Foundation sued to enforce the easement. It sought an injunction to
remove the structure in addition to declaratory relief and attorney's
fees. 7 2 The trial court granted summary judgment to the Foundation,
ordering the landowner to demolish the structure and awarding
attorney fees. 173 The appellate court upheld the trial court ruling,
noting that the easement agreement was clear on its face, and it
prohibited the construction of new structures on the property without
the written consent of the Foundation. 174  It also rejected the
landowner's argument that it was unreasonable for the Foundation to
refuse to negotiate with him until he had demolished the new
structure. 175 It emphasized the fact that the Foundation had not
167. Id.
168. Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110,
1111 (D.C. 1994).
169. Id. at 1110.
170. Id. at 1112.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Bagley, 647 A.2d at 1112.
174. Id. at 1113.
175. Id.
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exercised its right to enter the property and tear down the structure
itself, which would have been a more extreme remedy. 176
B. Courts Deciding Whether to Grant an Injunction
1. Fox Chapel v. Walters
In this case, the plaintiff was a nonprofit conservation organization
that owned natural land upon which it had granted a conservation
easement to the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA"). 177 The defendants owned an affirmative easement for use
of the property, and the plaintiff alleged that the defendants
repeatedly went beyond the boundaries of their affirmative easement
and trespassed onto the part of the property encumbered by
conservation easement. 178 The defendants sought to work directly
with the USDA to amend the conservation easement to allow the
defendants' continued use of the property.' 79 The plaintiff sued for a
temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants from going
beyond the easement in their deed and from negotiating with the
USDA without including the plaintiff in the negotiations.18 0  In
balancing the equities between the parties,18 1 the trial court found that
the plaintiff had not proved the possibility of irreparable harm if the
temporary restraining order was not granted. 182 The plaintiff made
only general allegations of harm to wildlife,' 83 and the court
suggested that it needed more details to agree that irreparable damage
was imminent:
176. Id.
177. Fox Chapel v. Walters, No. CV 07-8008-PCT-JAT, 2007 WL 2265684, at
*1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2007).
178. Id. at *1-2.
179. Id. at *2.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *3. The court defines its test for temporary injunction as follows:
"[T]he moving party must show: 1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 2)
the possibility of irreparable injury to the moving party if injunctive relief is not
granted, 3) a balance of hardships favoring the moving party, and 4) advancement
of the public interest." Id.
182. Fox Chapel, 2007 WL 2265684, at *2.
183. Id.
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Plaintiff has not stated if the alleged damage rises to the
level of killing plants and animals or is simply the bruising
of a plant branch due to the occasional misstep .... A
blanket claim of disruption of wildlife, without any specific
facts, is not enough for Plaintiff to satisfy its burden of
showing irreparable harm. 1
84
The court concluded that, without such details, the plaintiff could
not prove that the balance of the hardship tipped sharply in its
favor. 185 It denied the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining
order.186  The denial was made without prejudice if the plaintiff
determined it could meet its burden.' 87
2. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords
The approach of a Maine trial court to a request for temporary
injunction differs sharply from the approach the Fox Chapel court
took. In Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, the defendants purchased
eighty-five acres subject to a conservation easement and fifteen
adjacent, unencumbered acres. 188 They began using both for music
festivals, camping, and other profit-making activities that brought as
many as one thousand people to the site at one time. 189 In evaluating
the land trust's request for injunction, the court acknowledged that
the trust had produced sparse evidence of irreparable harm.190 The
court, however, went on to infer the harm, saying that having so
many people on the property would "disturb the condition and natural
environment of the easement area in such a way that it would take
many years to return the land to its current state." 191 It also rejected
the defendant's claim of economic harm, saying that the defendants
could hold the music festival on the fifteen unencumbered acres that
they owned. 192 This would minimize the economic impact, meaning
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *3.
187. Id.
188. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, No. RE-07-077, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS
140 (Super. Ct. June 29, 2007), aft'd, 2009 ME 29, 967 A.2d 690.
189. Id. at *2.
190. Id. at *13.
191. Id. at *13-14.
192. See id. at *14.
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the potential damage to the natural area outweighed any harm to the
landowners. 193 The court issued the injunction, restricting festival-
goers from entering the encumbered eighty-five acres but allowing
the festival to continue on the fifteen unencumbered acres. 194
C. Courts Enforcing Challenged Conservation Easement
Agreements
In a pair of New York cases, citizens and town leaders challenged
conservation easements on public park lands that towns had donated
to land trusts. 195 In Western New York Land Conservancy v. Town of
Amherst, the Amherst town board passed two resolutions to enter into
a conservation easement agreement with the Western New York
Land Conservancy ("WNYLC") in which it would donate a
conservation easement on a town-owned park and pay WNYLC
$69,000 to monitor and manage the easement.' 96 After an election
and change in membership, the town board later voted to rescind
those resolutions. 197 The WNYLC sued for specific enforcement of
the contract. 198 Amherst argued that WNYLC had not provided any
consideration for the contract. 99 The New York appellate division
disagreed, finding "legally sufficient consideration.., in the form of
conservation benefits and monitoring and reporting services to be
provided by WNYLC. ' 2 °° It affirmed the lower court's ruling, which
ordered the enforcement of the contract. 20 1 In LaBarbera v. Town of
Woodstock, a case bound by the precedent set by Amherst, a trial
court judge found that consideration could take the form of public
benefit and that "the preservation of [a public] property as an
undeveloped park and recreational facility provides a clear public
benefit.... 202
193. Windham Land Trust, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS at *14-15.
194. Id. at *15.
195. W. N.Y. Land Conservancy v. Town of Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App.
Div. 2004); LaBarbera v. Town of Woodstock, 814 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
196. Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 770.
200. Id.
201. Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
202. LaBarbera v. Town of Woodstock, 814 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
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D. Courts Imposing Criminal Sanctions for Conservation
Easement Violations
1. United States v. Blackman
In this federal case, the defendant owned a home that was subject
to a historic preservation easement that the National Park Service
203("NPS") monitored. The easement required the landowner to get
NPS approval for any changes made to the exterior of the home. 20 4
When he and the NPS could not agree on renovation plans for the
home, he decided to proceed without NPS approval and removed the
front porch of the home.2 05 NPS sought and obtained a temporary
restraining order that prevented the owner from doing any further
renovations until their disagreement was resolved.20 6  Despite the
restraining order, the owner removed the siding from three exterior
walls of the home and covered the newly exposed parts with a
commercial moisture barrier. 20 7 At the Government's request, the
trial court found the defendant to be in criminal contempt through his
willful violation of the temporary restraining order and fined him
$4,000.208
2. United States v. Peterson
In this case, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's
misdemeanor conviction of a landowner who drained four wetlands
that were subject to conservation easements. 20 9 The appellate court
noted that the Government produced sufficient evidence to support
the conviction, and it especially noted a map that clearly showed the
wetlands were within the easement boundaries.
210
203. United States v. Blackman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12572, at *1 (4th Cir.
May 31, 2007).
204. Id. at *2.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *3.
207. Id. at *4.
208. Blackman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS at *4.
209. United States v. Peterson, 178 F.App'x 615, 616 (8th Cir. 2006).
210. See id. at 617.
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3. United States v. Vesterso
In this case, members of a local water board wanted to undertake
two drainage projects that would cross private lands upon which the
United States Fish & Wildlife Service ("USFWS") owned
conservation easements for the protection of wetlands. 2 11 The North
Dakota Water Commission granted permits for the projects but
warned the members of the water board to follow the requirements of
the conservation easements. 2 12  The project went forward with
members of the water board on-site supervising construction.
21 3
Despite this supervision, the construction violated the terms of the
conservation easement. 21 4 Once the USFWS learned of the violation,
it charged the three members of the water board with the petty
offense of damaging federal easements. 21 5  The district court
convicted them and gave them two years of probation, which was
terminable if they restored the area covered by the easements to its
original condition. 216 The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction on
appeal,21 7 rejecting the defendants' argument that they could not be
convicted of a criminal offense because they were acting in their
official capacities. 21 8 The court noted that officials are immune from
civil suit for acts taken in official capacity, but this immunity does
not protect officials from criminal prosecution. 2 19 It also pointed out
the potential danger in making officials immune from criminal
prosecution for the violation of easements:
If these officials could avoid prosecution, pressure from
citizens might convince the County Water Board to do
what the citizens could not. Or, it is possible that County
Water Board officials might themselves have an interest
furthered by the destruction of wetlands on federal
easements. The district court found in this case that two of
211. United States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1987).
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 1238.
215. Id.
216. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at1238.
217. Id. at 1236.
218. Id. at 1243.
219. Id.
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the appellants had private farming operations which were
benefited by the County Water Board projects. If the
ultimate goal of the Act is to prevent the destruction of
wildfowl habitat, that goal would be significantly hampered
if state officials were not subject to its criminal
provisions.
220
E. Court Awarding Compensatory and Punitive Damages for an
Egregious Conservation Easement Violation
An extensive search revealed just one published opinion in which a
court awarded civil damages for the violation of a conservation
easement. In February 2008, Cullen v. Western New York Land
Conservancy made headlines, after a New York trial court awarded a
land trust $98,181 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages after the defendant neighbor blatantly and
repeatedly violated a conservation easement held by the Western
New York Land Conservancy ("WNYLC"), and trespassed on an
221adjacent nature preserve owned by the Conservancy. 22  Despite
repeated warnings from the land trust, he clear-cut forested areas that
had eighty years of growth, cut two roads through the natural area,
and knowingly encroached on the adjacent nature preserve by
building a new pond.222
The defendant appealed the verdict, and the appellate court
affirmed the lower court's decision. 223 The defendant challenged the
compensatory damage award, arguing that the WNYLC's damage
calculations were speculative. 2 4  In rejecting that challenge, the
appellate court pointed out that the defendant's actions had made it
impossible for the WNYLC to make more accurate calculations
because the defendant's contractor had removed both the trees and
the stumps. 2
25
220. Id. at 1244.
221. Sheila McGrory-Klyza, In Favor of: How a Land Trust Won a Half Million
Dollar Judgment, SAVING LAND, Summer 2008, at 25, 25.
222. Id.
223. W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Cullen, 886 N.Y.S.2d 303, 303 (App.
Div. 2009).
224. Id. at 305.
225. Id.
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In affirming the award of punitive damages, the court listed many
facts that justified the award, including the defendant's statement to a
contractor, who expressed concern about encroaching on the
WNYLC's land, that "he had 'an attorney who loved to fight' and
that he could 'drag this out for a while."'' 226  The court further
justified its decision by acknowledging the dual motivations of
punishing the wrongdoer and deterring similar behavior in the
future.227 Finally, the court affirmed the amount of the punitive
damages, concluding that the amount of the award was in "reasonable
relation of the harm done and the flagrancy of the conduct causing
it.
228
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COURTS
Courts must be vigilant in ordering appropriate remedies for
conservation easement violations. They must take a holistic view of
a conservation easement and be mindful of the public policy in favor
of natural area conservation and easements. Courts should take
several steps to ensure appropriate enforcement of easements. First,
courts should look beyond the interests of the parties to a
conservation easement and consider the interest that the public has in
easements. Second, they should view harm to protected nature as
important as harm to economic interests. Third, courts should honor
the conservation intent of an easement by ordering restitution
wherever feasible. Fourth, courts should award damages where
restitution is impossible. Finally, courts should apply criminal
sanctions where easement violations are willful and have done
irreparable damage to the natural values of a property.
A. Courts Should Consider the Public Interest When Balancing
the Equities of the Parties
When balancing the equities between parties after a violation,
courts must begin expressly acknowledging and considering the
interest that the public has in conservation easements. Whether
landowners donate, sell, or "inherit" conservation easements from
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Cullen, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
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previous owners, they benefit, both directly and indirectly, from
owning land under conservation easement.
Reduced taxes are the most obvious benefit of conservation
easements. Owners who donate conservation easements may deduct
their value for federal income tax purposes. 229 Further, in recent
years Congress has made temporary changes to the tax code that give
more generous income tax incentives to easement donations than
other types of charitable donations. 230 A taxpayer who donates stock
(or another asset held for more than one year) may deduct any part of
that amount up to 30% of his adjusted gross income ("AGI") and may
spread the deduction over six tax years.23' Until the end of 2009, a
taxpayer who donated a conservation easement could deduct up to
50% of her AG1232 and spread the deduction over sixteen tax years.
233
In addition, she could deduct up to 100% of her AGI if most of her
income was derived from farming, ranching, or forestry activities.
23 4
While these special tax benefits expired at the end of 2009,
conservation groups are lobbying Congress to extend them and make
them permanent.
These added income tax incentives make it easier for many middle-
income farmers and ranchers to benefit from donating conservation
easements, 236 thereby encouraging more landowners to make
conservation easements. The incentives represent a large public stake
in those conservation easement donations. Different government
agencies have calculated the lost tax revenue anywhere from $245
million to $761 million over ten years.237 Courts must protect this
type of public investment.
Conservation easement donors also enjoy substantial estate tax
benefits. An estate may deduct an additional 40% of the value of
229. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2000).
230. Land Trust Alliance, How the Easement Incentive Works,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/taxincentives/federal/incentive-
info/?searchterm=None (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
231. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
232. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i).
233. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii).
234. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv-v).
235. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 8.
236. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 230.
237. Id.
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encumbered land from the estate, up to a maximum of $500,000.238
The estate of a landowner who donates an easement worth $500,000
on a piece of land with pre-easement value of $1,500,000 may be
able to deduct up to $900,000 from the value of that land for estate
239tax purposes. The estate tax incentive makes it possible for many
land-rich, cash-poor farmers and ranchers to pass family farms to
their children and grandchildren rather than forcing them to sell land
to pay estate taxes.
Finally, some conservation easement donors or sellers may also
enjoy state and local income tax benefits. Some states have enacted
income tax credits for conservation easement donors. 24 1  For
example, Maryland provides an income tax credit up to market value
to landowners who donate easements to the Maryland Environmental
Trust or the Maryland Agricultural Preservation Foundation.
242
Landowners may take a credit of up to $5,000 each year and may
carry over any excess for fifteen years. 24 3  In addition, property
owners may enjoy property tax savings due to the lowered market
value of the property. 244
The Amherst245 and LaBarbera246 cases provide good examples of
a court's weighing the public benefit appropriately. These New York
courts recognized the public benefit inherent in conservation
easements. The Amherst court found that conservation benefits were
legally sufficient consideration to make a valid contract between a
town and a land trust. 247  Bound by the Amherst precedent,
238. See 26 U.S.C. § 2031(c) (2000).
239. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation
Easement Donations - A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 36-37
(2004).
240. Land Trust Alliance, Conservation Easements,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conserve/have-land-to-save/how-to-conserve-
your-land-1/conservation-easements/?searchterm=None (last visited Feb. 17,
2010).
241. McLaughlin, supra note 239 at 39.
242. MD. CODE ANN. TAX-GEN. § 10-723 (2002); see also COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 39-22-522 (1989).
243. MD. CODE ANN. TAx-GEN. at § 10-723.
244. McLaughlin, supra note 239 at 39.
245. See W. N.Y. Land Conservancy v. Town of Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d 768
(App. Div. 2004).
246. See LaBarbera v. Town of Woodstock, 814 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
247. See Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
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LaBarbera also built on that legacy by making clear that preserving a
public property for park and recreational purposes served the public
good.2 8 More courts should follow this example in recognizing the
value of undeveloped public lands.
B. Courts Should View Harm to Nature as a Real Harm
The different outcomes in the Fox Chapel249 and Windham Land
Trust 25  cases illustrate how a judge's understanding of and
appreciation for nature can affect his or her view of a case. The Fox
Chapel decision is unfortunate, given the plaintiffs' claims that
defendants had repeatedly violated the conservation easement.
251
The defendants also attempted to modify the easement without
including the plaintiff (who was the original grantee) in the
negotiations, suggesting that they knew they were regularly violating
the easement. 252 This court should have been more willing to infer
environmental harm from this evidence that defendants were
misusing the property. The Windham Land Trust court took a much
more reasonable approach. Although it recognized that the plaintiffs
had done a poor job of showing evidence of environmental harm, 253 it
was willing to infer the obvious harm that hundreds or thousands of
festival-goers could cause by descending on a natural area at one
time.254 More courts should take this common-sense approach.
C. Order Restitution Where Possible
Despite its sympathy for the defendant and concern about the
conservation benefits of removing fill from the wetland, the trial
court in DiMaria did an admirable job of safeguarding the public
interest.255 That court wisely recognized that allowing one defendant
248. LaBarbera, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
249. Fox Chapel v. Walters, No. CV 07-8008-PCT-JAT, 2007 WL 2265684 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 6, 2007).
250. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, No. RE-07-077, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS
140 (Super. Ct., June 29, 2007), aff"d, 2009 ME 29, 967 A.2d 690.
251. Fox Chapel, 2007 WL2265684, at *1.
252. Id.
253. Windham Land Trust, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS 140, at *13.
254. Id. at *14.
255. Conservation Comm'n v. DiMaria, No. CV054009431S, 2008 WL
3307154, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 2008).
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to fill a wetland, even inadvertently, might lead others to do the
same. 256 The Bjork court echoed this concern in its opinion. 2 57 It
warned trial courts not to render conservation easement agreements
meaningless by allowing easement violators to win a balancing test
by making expensive alterations and then arguing that it would be too
costly to undo them.258 That court ordered remediation despite the
expense. 259
The Feduniak court ordered restitution despite the facts that the
previous owners had created the violation, the violation had been in
260place for many years, and restoration would be expensive. The
appellate court's criticism of the trial court for devaluing the public
interest in conservation 26 1 is a warning to California trial courts.
Courts in other states should follow the California example.
The Ponte decision is notable because the court went even further
than ordering the defendant to remove the violating platform.
262
Recognizing the defendants' lack of cooperation and good faith in
previous proceedings, the court also gave the government permission
to remove the platform if the defendants did not do so within a
specified time period.263 This very practical decision helped to
ensure a conservation benefit where the defendants were unlikely to
do so, even under a court order. Similarly, in Bagley, the appellate
court did not have patience for a defendant who knowingly violated
an easement. 264 If the court had not forced the demolition of the air
conditioning towers, it would have set a precedent of allowing
easement grantors to first violate their easements and then negotiate a
settlement. A precedent of allowing easement violations to stand
while the parties negotiate would put grantee organizations in a weak
negotiating position and would not uphold the public's interest in
conservation.
256. Id.
257. Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 575 (Il. App. Ct. 2008).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Feduniak v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 599 (Ct. App.
2007).
261. Id. at 615.
262. United States v. Ponte, 246 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (D. Me. 2003).
263. Id.
264. Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110,
1113 (D.C. 1994).
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D. Order Damages Where Restitution is Impossible or
Incomplete
Courts should not hesitate to order damages where defendants have
violated easements willfully and/or have caused permanent damages
to protected natural areas. News stories about the Cullen case reveal
that the defendant is a wealthy and powerful businessman. 265 He
may have believed that the resources he had available for litigation
would outlast those of a small land trust or that he could buy his way
out of the problem by making a settlement offer to the trust. The
trust benefited from at least 1,000 hours of time donated by a local
attorney, 266 but it also benefited from a judge and jury who were
willing to award meaningful damages where complete restitution was
impossible. More courts should follow their example and ensure that
conservation easement violators are penalized appropriately, thereby
deterring future violations. Easement holders can also use the
damage awards to restore the damaged area as completely as
possible, thus preserving the public investment in the easement.
E. Impose Criminal Sanctions Where Appropriate
Finally, courts should follow the lead of the Blackman,
267
Peterson,2 68 and Vesterso269 courts and impose criminal sanctions
where the conservation easement violation is willful. In all three
cases, the evidence showed that the defendants willfully violated the
conservation easements at issue.2 7 ° Imposing criminal sanctions for
willful violations is another way to deter those who might hope to
buy their way out of a knowing violation. The Vesterso decision is
very important in showing that when public officials violate
conservation easements, their office will not protect them from
prosecution.
265. Id. at 25.
266. Id. at 26.
267. United States v. Blackman, No. 06-4167, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12572 (4th
Cir. May 31, 2007).
268. United States v. Peterson, 178 F.App'x 615 (8th Cir. 2006).
269. United States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234, 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 1987).
270. See Blackman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12572, at *4; Peterson, 178 F.App'x
at 616-17; Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1236-38.
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VII. SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS
Land trusts, government agencies, and other environmental
advocates must be prepared to prevent conservation easement
violations from occurring and to take action when they do occur. The
case law review provides lessons in effective conservation easement
litigation. Of course, the conservation community should continue to
study the outcome of future cases and learn lessons from each
litigation experience.
A. Good Easement Drafting
The best way to prevent easement violations is to draft a good
easement agreement. Easement drafters should take care to draft
easement agreements that discourage violations by clearly stating the
terms of the agreement and the remedies available for violating the
agreement. Easement agreements should include a clear statement of
271purpose. They should clearly spell out what activities are
prohibited. Finally, they should specify what remedies are available
to the easement holder in case of violation. These remedies should
include damages clauses that require violators to pay for restoration
costs and, in cases where the damage is permanent, for diminishment
of natural, scenic or recreational value. This also could be
accomplished through a stipulated damages clause, which would
relieve the land trust of the burden of proving the amount of damages
but still provide a significant sum of money for restoration.
Easement agreements should also contain a fee-shifting clause that
allows both easement holders and third parties to collect attorney's
fees after successfully suing for easement enforcement. The Bjork
court stated explicitly that it did not allow the plaintiffs (who were
neighbors and not a party to the original easement) attorney's fees,
despite giving them other relief they desired, because the easement
agreement's fee-shifting clause addressed only the fees of an
enforcing grantee and not a third-party enforcer.272  Allowing
successful third-party plaintiffs to collect attorney's fees will
271. Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on
the Enforcement and Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation
and Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV.
373, 410 (2001).
272. Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 575-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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encourage third-party lawsuits for easement enforcement.
Encouraging third-party litigation will ensure that the public good is
protected in the long-term, even if the grantee organization is
unwilling or unable to sue for easement enforcement.
Grantee organizations should also consider including a clause in
the contract that would allow a lien to be placed on the property or
proceeds that result from the diversion of resources, such as timber or
soils, from an area protected by conservation easement. Because
conservation easements are recorded, the clause would provide notice
to a third party who participated in the removal or destruction of
protected resources.
B. Influencing a Balancing Test
Land trusts and their attorneys must prepare to influence an equity-
balancing test when litigating conservation easement violations in
court. Courts use balancing tests both when deciding whether to
issue injunctions and when determining what remedy to award when
they find a violation has occurred. 27 3 Fox Chapel v. Walters274 is an
important warning to conservation easement litigators that they
cannot assume courts will understand the natural value of a property
or how a violation can damage that value. It is not enough to claim
that an easement violation causes harm to wildlife or historic
structures. Litigators must be prepared to prove both the natural
value of the site and the harms that a violation will cause or already
has caused.
Studying case law from around the country can help
conservationists learn different approaches that judges take to this
area of law and develop litigation strategies that will appeal to those
approaches.
273. See, e.g., Feduniak v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 616 (Ct.
App. 2007) (applying a balancing test to determine what remedy to award after an
easement violation); Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, No. RE-07-077, 2007 Me.
Super. LEXIS 140, at *14-15 (Super. Ct., June 29, 2007), aff'd, 2009 ME 29, 67
A.2d 690 (using a balancing test to determine whether to award an injunction).
274. Fox Chapel v. Walters, No. CV 07-8008-PCT-JAT, 2007 WL 2265684 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 6, 2007).
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1. Expert Witnesses
One such strategy is to employ the use of experts. As the Fox
Chapel court demonstrated, some courts do not have an inherent
appreciation for the value of nature. 275 Land trusts should prove the
value of natural lands by expert testimony. Expert witnesses should
be familiar with the property and prepared to discuss endangered,
rare, and threatened flora and fauna, along with any important
historical or geological features of the property.
If the defense attempts to mitigate damages by showing that these
flora, fauna, or geological features exist elsewhere, the expert could
testify to the importance of creating redundancy in conservation
work. 76 When focusing on a particular species or habitat type, many
conservation groups try to protect it in multiple places so that there is
a "back-up" in case a catastrophic event (such as disease, tornado, or
fire) destroys one area.277 Some conservation groups are even using
redundancy as a strategy to prepare for global climate change. 278
Those involved with the Cullen case believe that expert testimony
was crucial to their case. 279  The land trust hired an independent
engineering firm to prepare a damage report and testify at trial.28 °
Those engineers were able to explain the impact of the loss of eighty-
year growth. 28 Land trust representatives believe that the engineers'
testimony, along with the testimony of the biologist who did the
baseline easement documentation, were crucial to winning the
case.
282
In their 2001 article, Thompson and Jay illustrate the potential
power of expert witnesses through their analysis of the Redwood
Construction v. Doornbosch case. 283  They emphasize the court's
justification of its decision to grant the developer's motion for
summary judgment-the developer had presented an unrebutted
275. Id. at *2.
276. Craig R. Groves et al., Planning for Biodiversity Conservation: Putting
Conservation Science into Practice, 52 BIOSCIENCE 499, 506 (2002).
277. Id. at 509.
278. Id. at 510.
279. McGrory-Klyza, supra note 221, at 25-26.
280. Id. at 26.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Thompson & Jay, supra note 271, at 397 (citing Redwood Constr. v.
Doornbosch, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 1998)).
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prima facie case that its access easement would not violate the
conservation easement on the property. 284  Thompson and Jay
speculate that the developer presented a credible expert witness, and
the land trust did not, helping the court justify its granting the motion
for summary judgment. 285
2. Visual Aids
Land trusts should take advantage of the power of pictures in the
courtroom. The judge's visit to the property in question in Bjork v.
Draper286 demonstrates how important it can be to a court to be able
to visualize a property and any potential problems associated with it.
The Peterson court notes that the map and photographic evidence
produced by the government to show the location of the protected
areas provided "more than adequate" support for the magistrate's
ruling for the government. 28 7  Because property encumbered by
conservation easement is often scenic, photographs could help courts
understand the importance of what the conservation easement
protects. Visual aids are a powerful weapon to bring life to dry
expert scientific testimony.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Easements are powerful tools for conservation. Americans lose
more natural lands, agricultural lands, and historically important
buildings to development every day. Conservation easements
provide a cost-effective, private-sector mechanism for curbing that
loss. As conservation easements continue to grow in popularity, land
trusts, government conservation agencies, legislatures, and the courts
must work together to ensure that conservation easements are upheld
forever. This cooperative effort toward maintaining the public good
inherent in easements will assure that future generations will enjoy




286. Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
287. United States v. Peterson, 178 F.App'x 615, 617 (8th Cir. 2006).
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